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THE EXPLANATORY VALUE OF THE UJNCONSCIOUS* 
MICHAEL MARTIN 
University of Colorado 
It is common knowledge that the notion of the unconscious is an essential part of 
psychoanalytic theory. In recent years, however, Arthur Pap and A. C. MacIntyre have 
argued that Freud's theoryof the unconscious is not explanatory. But a close examination 
of Pap's and MacIntyre's arguments reveals that they are invalid. If one wishes to 
show that the theory of the unconscious is unexplanatory, different arguments will be 
necessary. 
It is common knowledge that the notion of the unconscious is an essential part of 
psychoanalytic theory. In recent years, however, the explanatory value of the uncon- 
scious has been called into question. At least two philosophers-Arthur Pap' and A. C. 
MacIntyre2 have argued that Freud's theory of the unconscious is not explanatory. 
Pap's and MacIntyre's criticisms, however, turn on entirely different analyses of the 
unconscious. On the one hand, Pap has argued that the unconscious should be con- 
strued as a "dispositional state" rather than as a hypothetical construct such as the 
electron in physics. On Pap's view, "dispositional states" are not explanatory. On the 
other hand, MacIntyre has argued that the unconscious, like the electron, can be 
construed as a hypothetical construct. But MacIntyre has maintained that the un- 
conscious so construed, unlike the electron, is not explanatory. 
Without wishing to defend psychoanalysis in general or the explanatory value of 
the unconscious in particular, I will argue that the arguments presented by Pap and 
MacIntyre are invalid and that if one wishes to show that the theory of the uncon- 
scious is not explanatory, different arguments will have to be presented. 
I 
1. Pap's Account of the Unconscious. Arthur Pap has suggested that "the unconscious" 
should be construed as a dispositional term. On Pap's view, dispositional terms are 
characteristic of the "pre-theoretical" stage of science. He believes that, usually, to 
ascribe a disposition is to issue a "promissory note" for the future discovery of a causal 
generalization which, together with relevant singular statements, i.e., statements of 
initial conditions, would explain an observed regularity.3 In making dispositional 
statements in the pre-theoretical stage of science one anticipates the discovery of a 
causal law, but one does not assert the existence of such a law. Hence, one can not 
explain some given phenomenon by reference to dispositional states; one only promises 
that the phenomenon will be explained when some relevant causal law is found. 
In relation to psychoanalysis, to ascribe an unconscious dislike to a person is, 
* Received March, 1963. 
1 Arthur Pap, "On the Empirical Interpretation of Psychoanalytic Concepts," Psychoanalysis, 
Scientific Method and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1959), ed. S. Hook, 
pp. 283-304. 
2 A. C. MacIntyre, The Unconscious (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). 
3 Pap here presupposes Hempel and Oppenheim's "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," 
Philosophy of Science, XV, 1948. 
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according to Pap, to ascribe a dispositional state. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose 
that an item of a person's behavior is causally explained when one says that it expresses 
such and such unconscious dislike of another person; rather one is issuing a promissory 
note to the effect that the first person has some intrinsic property K, e.g., traumatic 
sexual experience in infancy, such that any person with the same intrinsic property K 
would probably react similarly in similar circumstances. The term "unconscious" 
cannot appear in any genuine causal explanation because its function is only to mark, 
not to solve, a problem of explanation. It marks the lack of some causal generalization. 
When such a generalization is found, this generalization will be used in explaining 
the behavior. At such a time the word "unconscious" will have no point; the promise 
will be fulfilled. 
Pap is opposed to construing the unconscious as a hypothetical construct e.g., as 
subatomic particles in physics are usually construed, for two basic reasons: 
(1) Pap maintains that phsychoanalysis cannot be legitimately compared with 
physics. He argues: 
A methodological justification of psychoanalysis by comparison with theoretical 
physics is out of place, because psychoanalysis is too young a science still to be in a 
position to lay a precise and solid theoretical foundation for its rough empirical 
generalizations.4 
(2) Pap argues that uncritical acceptance of talk about unconscious mental events 
as hypothetical constructs arises from "a tacit objectification of psychological language." 
Pap seems to mean by this that it is logically impossible for a desire or a wish to occur 
without the subject of the wish or desire being aware of it when he introspects. This 
is because desires and wishes "are just the sort of 'private' states that are meant by 
the old-fashioned expression "state of consciousness.' "5 
There is then only an apparent similarity between an atom and an unconscious 
wish construed as a hypothetical construct. It is not part of the meaning of "atom," 
for example, that it cannot be seen; it is just a contingent fact i.e., the impossibility 
involved in not seeing an atom is just an empirical impossibility. But part of the 
meaning of the term "wish," for example, as it is ordinarily used, is the possibility 
of introspective awareness. So, to speak of unconscious wishes as "efficacious mental 
states" is not like speaking of an "invisible atom" but rather like speaking of a "shape- 
less cube." 
2. "Promissory Note" Analysis. Whatever merits Pap's "dispositional" analysis of 
the unconscious may have, his analysis so warps the original and present day function 
of the concept of the unconscious that it is scarcely recognizable. 
In the first place, when psychoanalysts talk about unconscious dislike, they are not 
"promising" the discovery of causal laws e.g., laws connecting childhood traumatic 
sexual experiences and adult personality; psychoanalysts are asserting that there are 
such laws. To be sure, psychoanalysts may be mistaken in their claims, and they would 
be surely hard-pressed to state these laws in any precise way, but this is not the point 
at issue. Thus Hartmann, in Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse, maintains that psycho- 
4 Pap, op. cit., p. 290. 
5 Ibid. 
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analysis deals with causal laws, and argues: "We have explained a process when we 
have succeeded in discovering by what law it is governed."6 
In the second place, psychoanalytic statements about the unconscious not only do 
not "promise" the discovery of causal laws, but on the contrary they purport to 
explain the causal laws that they assert, rightly or wrongly, to exist. Indeed, the whole 
purpose of the unconscious is to provide the explanatory connecting link between 
certain spatially and temporally separated, but supposedly lawfully related, phenomena 
e.g., certain childhood and adult behavior-relations that remains unintelligible other- 
wise. Maclntyre is surely correct when he says that in psychoanalysis: 
There is first the claim that it is a correlation between certain types of childhood 
experience and certain types of adult behaviour. Psychology owes an immeasurable 
debt to Freud for having suggested so clearly the existence of such correlations, but 
there is nothing peculiarly "Freudian" about them. Freud argues that a thrifty, some- 
what ill-tempered attitude is the result in early life of the wrong sort of potting 
training or that adult attitudes to one's wife are in some cases correlated with childhood 
attitudes to one's mother.7 
And he goes on to say: 
So far as theory is concerned, Freud pins everything upon a ... claim, that the 
reason why childhood events are correlated with adult experience ... is because 
menmories have been repressed, have been operative in some form or other in the 
unconscious and have manifested themselves in overt behaviour.8 
Pap is aware of the fact that psychoanalysts make causal assertions about the relation 
between childhood experiences and adult behavior, and that these laws can be used 
in explanations. Pap remarks: 
Thus psychoanalysts often succeed in tracing neurotic adult behavior to certain kinds 
traumatic experience in childhood. Also Freud's famous case of the bride's disap- 
pointment during her wedding night leading to a strange form of compulsive 
behavior falls into this category. Here we have genetic laws, of an imperfect probabilistic 
character. ...9 
He goes on to say: "They [the genetic laws] can legitimately be used for probabilistic 
and in principle confirmable explanations of abnormal behavior patterns."'10 But in 
the next breath Pap makes the remarkable comment: 
What I am suggesting is that the word "unconscious" cannot appear in any genuine 
causal explanation, whether rigorously deterministic or probabilistic, whether in terms 
of the postulates of a rigorous theory of human behavior or, more modestly, in 
terms of pragmatically reliable empirical generalizations, because its function is 
only to mark, not to solve, a problem of explanation.11 
6 Heinz Hartmann, Die Grundlagen der Psychoanalyse (Leipzig, 1927), p. 11. This sentence 
was translated by Muller-Braunschweig in a review of Hartmann's book in International j3ournal 
of Psychoanalysis, 10, 1929, pp. 451-465. 
7 MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 67. 
8 Ibid., p. 69. 
9 Pap, op. cit., p. 287. 
10 Ibid. 
1 Ibid., p. 288. 
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In the very examples of "genetic laws" that Pap cites, however, the unconscious is 
supposed to serve as the connecting link between certain experiences in childhood and 
adult personality, and also between certain experiences on the bride's wedding night 
and subsequent compulsive behavior. Pap is clearly mistaken, therefore, when he 
maintains that the "characteristically psychoanalytic meaning" of "unconscious" 
"seems to me to be dispositional [i.e., a promissory note for a causal law]; or more 
accurately, this is the meaning that remains after it is divested of misleading meta- 
phorical connotations."12 For, as we have seen, the notion of the unconscious is not, 
in fact, a promissory note for a genetic law, but rather a conceptual link that purports 
to connect events that psychoanalysts rightly or wrongly assert to be lawfully related, 
e.g., it purports to connect certain childhood sexual experiences and certain adult 
personality. So, after the "misleading metaphorical connotation" is removed, we end 
up with a hypothetical construct that purports to explain a genetic law, not a promissory 
note for these genetic laws. 
Pap's two arguments against a hypothetical construct interpretation have very little 
force. 
3. Argument From Immaturity. It would be foolish to deny the obvious fact that 
physics is an established and precise science and that psychoanalysis is not. But the 
inference that Pap seems to make from this undeniable fact, namely the inference that 
no hypothetical constructs are permissible in an immature science, is quite another 
matter. There is no reason why an immature science cannot use hypothetical constructs 
to explain and relate "the rough generalizations" of which Pap speaks; nor is there 
any reason why hypothetical constructs cannot be used in a theory to explain "genetic 
laws of an imperfect probabilistic character." To be sure, the hypothesis of the 
unconscious may be an illegitimate one e.g., because it cannot be disconfirmed; or, 
it may turn out that the genetic laws that psychoanalysts assert and that the unconscious 
is supposed to explain may be disconfirmed or may be so vaguely stated that they are 
virtually impossible to disconfirm. Nonetheless, the illegitimacy of the notion of the 
unconscious cannot be because it purports to be a hypothetical construct in an immature 
science. 
Again, although psychoanalysis is not "in a position to lay a precise, and solid 
theoretical foundation" this does not mean that no theoretical foundation should be 
attempted. Pap seems to imply at times that hypothetical constructs are found only 
in advanced sciences. But only a cursory examination of the history of science will 
show this to be false.'3 What Pap must mean is that hypothetical constructs, although 
they have in fact been introduced into immature sciences, ought not to be. But we 
can find no justification for this contention. 
4. Argument From Ordinary Usage. One wonders at times what philosophers who 
appeal to "ordinary meaning" in their arguments mean by "ordinary meaning." 
Pap's claim that the possibility of introspective awareness of a wish is part of the 
ordinary meaning of "wish" is a case in point. Now a look at the dictionary does not 
substantiate Pap's contention, for the terms "awareness," "consciousness" and so 
12 Ibid., p. 284. 
13 In ancient astronomy, to name an obvious example, "spheres" where hypothetical 
constructs that were used in explanation. See T. S. Kuhn, The Copernician Revolution (New 
York: Random House, 1959). 
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on do not appear in the definition of the term "wish." So, if a dictionary definition is 
what is meant by the "ordinary meaning" of "wish," then we find that the expression 
"unconscious wish" is not analogous to "shapeless cube" as Pap has claimed, for the 
latter expression is, in fact, a contradiction according to the dictionary.14 
If we are to accept the actual verbal practices of people as determining the ordinary 
meaning of an expression then, by Pap's own admission, the expressions "unconscious 
wish" or "unconscious hatred" are commonly used to refer to some efficacious mental 
states of an individual. Pap has admitted that "a good many people," "some profes- 
sional psychologists" and "some educated laymen" use expressions such as "He 
really hates him, though he is not aware of it; he is not lying when he denies this 
emotion, he is just unconsciously repressing it."'15 But, according to Pap, these people 
are somehow in error because this use of the expression makes no "sense" in the 
"ordinary sense" of "wish." One begins to wonder if Pap is the one who has the 
extraordinary meaning of "wish," or if he is not just stipulating, as he did when he 
excluded hypothetical constructs from immature sciences. 
To be perfectly accurate, Pap does not claim that the actual awareness of e.g., hatred, 
is part of the ordinary meaning of "hatred," but rather that the potential awareness 
of the hatred is, i.e., if one were to introspect, then one would be aware of the hatred. 
Pap says that "awareness of one's hatred" of somebody denotes "an act of introspection 
which need not, and often does not, accompany the introspectable state." This means 
that "one can hate a person at a time when, oblivious of the enemy, one is in a relaxed, 
even loving mood," so that "emotions and desires may occur without any [actual] 
awareness of them."'16 But Pap insists that the possibility of the introspective awareness 
is part of the meaning of "hatred." 
So, as far as one can tell, Pap believes that there are some mental states of a person 
of which the person is aware and some mental states of the person of which the person 
is not aware, but of which he can become aware by ordinary introspection. It is remark- 
able how much Pap's account corresponds to Freud's description of the mental 
systems Cs (consciousness) and Pcs (pre-consciousness) in his essay The Unconscious. 
But the fact that it [an idea] so belongs [to the system Cs] does not unequivocally 
determine its relation to consciousness. It is not yet conscious, but it is certainly 
capable of entering consciousness, according to J. Breuer's expression, that is, it can 
now, without any special resistance and given certain conditions, become the object 
of consciousness. In consideration of this capacity to become conscious we also call 
the system Cs the "preconscious."'17 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that Pap is correct in maintaining that 
"part of the ordinary meaning" of, e.g., "hatred," is either that the hatred is conscious 
or is capable of becoming conscious by means of ordinary introspection. But surely 
this does not exclude Freud from extending the meaning of the term, for the process 
of redefining the ordinary meaning of terms is a respectable part of the scientific 
enterprise. Thus Hempel has noted: 
14 O.E.D., 1933, XII, pp. 196-197; II, p. 1233. 
15 Pap, op. cit., p. 293. 
16 Ibid., p. 294. 
17 S. Freud, "The Unconscious," Collected Papers (New York: Basic Books, 1959), IV, p. 106. 
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In its exploratory pretheoretical research, science will often have to avail itself of the 
vocabulary of conversational language ... but in the course of its growth it has to 
modify its conceptual apparatus so as to enhance the theoretical import of the resulting 
system .. without being hampered by the consideration of preserving and explicating the 
prescientific usage of conventional terms taken over into its vocabulary.18 
If we accept Pap's contention about the ordinary meaning of words such as "wish" 
and "hatred," then we can construe Freud simply as having extended the meaning of 
these words to include mental states one becomes aware of after therapy. In other 
words, instead of allowing mental state terms to refer only to (1) states of the mind 
which we are actually conscious of and (2) states of the mind which we are potentially 
conscious of by means of ordinary introspection, Freud has allowed mental state 
terms to refer also to (3) states of the mind which we are potentially conscious of by 
means of the techniques of psychoanalysis.'9 Understood in this way, it is clear that 
Freud was at most extending ordinary usage. Thus John Wisdom has maintained: 
Psycho-analysts in order to reveal to us things about ourselves modify and sophisticate 
our conceptions of love, hate, jealousy, envy, sympathy, sense of responsibility. They 
use familiar words not with a disregard of established usage but not in bondage to it.20 
Indeed, Freud thought he was extending the meaning of the term "mental" and, 
in keeping with good scientific practice, he justified this supposed extension on practical 
grounds. In The Unconscious he argues: 
But it is more important to make clear to our own minds that this objection [i.e., 
that latent recollection can not be described as mental processes] is based on the 
identification-not, it is true, explicitly stated but regarded as axiomatic-of conscious 
and mental. This identification is either a petitio principii and begs the question 
whether all that is mental is also necessarily conscious, or else it is a matter of con- 
vention, of nomenclature. In this latter case it is of course no more open to refutation 
than any other convention. The only question that remains is whether it proves so useful 
that we must needs adopt it. To this we may reply that the conventional identification 
of the mental with the conscious is thoroughly unpractical.21 
I can only conclude that Pap has failed to show that the unconscious cannot be 
legitimately construed as a hypothetical construct. His notion of the promissory note 
character of the unconscious misses the whole point of the introduction of this concept, 
and his arguments from the immaturity of psychoanalysis and from the misuse of the 
ordinary meaning of mental terms are invalid. 
18 Carl Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science," International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. II, No. 7, p. 49. 
'9 Pap seems aware of the fact that Freud used, e.g., the term "unconscious wish," to refer 
to wishes that became conscious only under therapy. Yet he concludes from this, quite incon- 
sistently I think, that unconscious wishes are "dispositional states." To be consistent Pap would 
also have to conclude that wishes one can become aware of through ordinary introspection, 
although one is not aware of them at the time, are "dispositional states." But he argues instead 
that these wishes "causally determine human behavior," while unconscious wishes do not. 
See Pap, op. cit., pp. 288-289. 
20 John Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. 271. 
21 S. Freud, "The Unconscious," Collected Papers, IV, p. 100. 
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5. MacIntvre's Criticism of the Unconscious. Maclntyre has maintained that the 
unconscious, like the electron, may well be a hypothetical construct. He argues: 
Certainly the unconscious and its contents are ex hypothesi unobservable, and if 
philosophy were still at the stage when positivism was waging a war to the death against 
unobservables no doubt the whole conception of the unconscious would have to be 
rejected. But the positivism that rejected unobservables in so wholesale a fashion 
was not merely too a priori in its framing of criteria by which concepts were to be judged 
legitimate or the reverse; it was also profoundly in error as to the character of scientific 
theorizing. For in such theorizing concepts which refer to unobservables have a 
legitimate, important and necessary place. And in elucidating the nature of the concept 
of the unconscious the possibility that it is a concept of this kind must be taken very 
seriously.22 
Maclntyre believes, however, that not all theories containing terms which refer 
to unobservable entities are legitimate in science. Some theories containing terms which 
refer to unobservables have great explanatory value, e.g., the modern theory of 
subatomic particles, but other theories containing terms which refer to unobservables 
have no explanatory power at all, e.g., the theory of the ether. The important question, 
therefore, is "whether the unconscious is to be classed with the electron as a notion 
of great explanatory power or with the ether as a bogus and empty theoretical 
concept.. "23 
Maclntyre suggests two distinct requirements for the admissibility of theories in 
science containing terms which refer to unobservables. Presumably, Maclntyre intends 
his requirements to distinguish theories with explanatory power, such as the theory 
of subatomic particles, from theories with no explanatory power, such as the theory 
of ether. 
(1) A theory T, containing some terms that refer to unobservable entities, is 
admissible in science if some empirical phenomena can be explained by T that are 
distinct from the phenomena T was originally introduced to explain.24 
(2) A theory T, containing some terms which refer to unobservable entities, is admis- 
sible in science if the elimination of T would result in a loss of predictive power.25 
Maclntyre judges Freud's theory of the unconscious by these requirements and 
concludes that the theory has no explanatory power. Briefly, he argues as follows. 
The real significance of Freud's theory of the unconscious is that it purports to 
explain why certain childhood events are correlated with certain adult experiences. 
However, "from the supposition of such an entity [the unconscious] what consequences 
22 Maclntyre, op. cit., p. 46. 
23 Ibid., p. 48. 
24 
"The theory must not merely be such that statements concerning the regularities which 
it was originally introduced to explain are deducible from it. We must also be able if the explana- 
tion of the regularities with which we were originally concerned is correct, to deduce further 
statements of a testable kind, the verifying of which constitutes the confirmation of the 
hypothesis." Ibid., p. 47. 
25 "Concepts which refer to unobservables will have a place on the higher steps of the deductive 
ladder if by using them we can formulate assertions from which observation statements can be 
deduced which are true and which could not be deduced from the theory unless such assertions 
were included." Ibid., pp., 47-48. 
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flow that could not otherwise be predicted ? Freud's hypotheses as to the infantile 
origin of adult traits and disorders can all be formulated without reference to it."26 
It should be noticed, first of all, that it is not completely clear whether Maclntyre's 
criticism of Freud's theory of the unconscious turns on his first or second requirement. 
(Indeed, it is not altogether certain that Maclntyre realizes he has set forth two distinct 
requirements.) By his question "From the supposition of such an entity what con- 
sequences flow that could not otherwise be predicted ?" he could mean (1) that Freud's 
theory of the unconscious entails nothing more than what it was originally introduced 
to explain, (his first requirement), or (2) that elimination of the theory of the un- 
conscious would not result in a loss of any predictive power (his second requirement). 
It must be emphasized that these are different requirements. This can be seen from 
a simple example. Consider a theory T1 containing some terms that refer to unobserv- 
able entities. T1 is introduced to explain only one empirical phenomenon described 
by an observation statement O1; hence T1 entails 01. But T1 also entails 02 where this 
observation statement describes a different phenomenon. Hence this meets Maclntyre's 
first requirement. Assume that T1 entails only 0? and 02. T1 can then be replaced by 
a theory T1 made up solely of the conjunction 01.02. This replacement would contain 
only observational terms and yet would entail everything T1 entailed. Hence T1 would 
presumably not meet MacIntyre's second requirement although it met his first. 
6. MacIntyre's Requirement (1). Let us consider Maclntyre's first requirement. This 
requirement is often proposed in order to eliminate ad hoc hypotheses that are used 
to explain a phenomenon but which no further evidence could refute. It is not strictly 
correct to say that such hypotheses are not disconfirmable since they do have empirical 
consequences, i.e., statements describing the phenomenon they were originally 
introduced to explain follow from the theory. But these hypotheses become discon- 
firmable, as it were, on just one move, since no further consequences can be derived. 
Now depending on how one interprets Maclntyre, his claim that Freud's theory 
of the unconscious fails to meet his first requirement is either (i) false or (ii) unjustified. 
(i) Sometimes Maclntyre writes as if he were interested only in what Freud claims 
and not in the truth of Freud's claims. In particular he seems to be concerned with 
Freud's claim that there are correlations between certain specific childhood experiences 
and certain specific aspects of adult personalities and Freud's further claim that such 
correlations can be deduced from the theory of the unconscious. On one reading 
of Maclntyre, he seems to be asking what more is claimned to follow from the theory. 
Maclntyre's answer is nothing, hence the theory of the unconscious is "empty" and 
"Cbogus." 
But if we are talking about what is claimned to follow from the theory, the answer to 
Maclntyre's question is "almost everything significant in human behavior." Latter- 
day psychoanalysts have claimed to find anal eroticism in all manner of apparently 
innocent behavior. Indeed, as any reader of Imago must know, new "verified con- 
sequences" of unconscious anal eroticism are reported in art, literature and legend 
in each issue. Not only are all these things supposed to be accounted for by con- 
sequences of the theory, but contemporary psychoanalytic journals report the "Cfinding"' 
of new correlations between childhood oral and genital behavior and adult behavior 
in every issue. That such correlations obtain is also an alleged consequence of the 
theory. Moreover, later developments in psychoanalytic ego psychology claim to deduce 
26 Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
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accounts of all rational behavior, at least in part, from the theory of the unconscious.27 
Instead of nothing following from the theory of the unconscious except what it was 
originally introduced by Freud to explain, if we take the claims of latter-day analysts 
seriously, an account of practically all human behavior is supposed to follow from it. 
Indeed, the alleged "new verified consequences" of the theory reported by Freud's 
followers make Freud's claims of correlations look modest in comparison. 
(ii) Maclntyre may, on the other hand, be interpreted as talking not about what 
is claimed by psychoanalysts to follow from the theory, but about what consequences, 
besides the original correlations which did infact follow from the theory, do follow from 
it. Maclntyre's thesis, on this interpretation, is that no more consequences follow from 
it. To determine this, however, is surely not an easy task. Maclntyre seems to assume 
that the empirical consequences (if any) of a vaguely and metaphorically stated theory 
such as psychoanalysis should be obvious at a glance. But surely, to determine if anyt- 
hing follows from Freud's theory of the unconscious aside from what it was originally 
introduced to explain, requires not only a close examination of the relation of the 
unconscious to other Freudian concepts, but also a close examination of the alleged 
inferences drawn from the theory by contemporary analysts, ethnologists,28 exper- 
imental psychologists,29 and so on. One can hardly know the further consequences 
of psychoanalytic theory without endeavoring to examine the arguments of those 
who purport to derive further consequences from it. Indeed, one of the major tasks 
in evaluating experimental and anthropological studies of psychoanalytic theory is to 
determine whether they do, in fact, test consequences of the theory. Maclntyre argues 
independently of all recent work purporting to draw testable inferences from the theory 
of the unconscious; hence it is hardly surprising that he fails to find any further con- 
sequences of the theory. This is not to say that MacIntyre is incorrect in his conclusion 
that nothing else follows from the theory, but only that he has failed to give good 
reasons in support of this conclusion. 
7. MacIntyre's Requirement (2). As far as Maclntyre's second requirement is 
concerned, it would be a mistake to suppose that it would serve to eliminate theories 
which postulate unobservable entities such as the unconscious, but not theories which 
postulate unobservable entities such as electrons. A purely logical finding of William 
Craig30 shows that any theory T1 containing some terms which refer to unobservable 
27 See Heinz Hartmann, "Ichpsychologie und Anpassungsproblem," Internat. Zeitschrift Fur 
Psychoanalyse und Imago, 1939, 24, pp. 62-135. 
28 See for example John W. M. Whiting and Irvin L. Child, Child Training and Personality 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); Herbert Barry "Relationship Between Child Training 
and Pictorial Arts," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, pp. 380-383; M. A. Straus, 
"Anal and Oral Frustration in Relation to Sinhalese Personality," Sociometry, 20, 1957, pp. 
21-31; M. Spiro and R. G. D'Andrade, "A Cross-Cultural Study of Some Supernatural Beliefs," 
American Anthropologist, 60, pp. 456-466. 
29 See for example W. Sewell, "Infant Training and the Personality of the Child," American 
J7ournal of Sociology, 58, 1952-1953, pp. 150-159; Stanley M. Friedman, "An Empirical Study 
of the Castration and Oedipus Complexes," Genetic Psychology Monographs, 46, pp. 61-130; 
Gerald S. Blum, "A Study of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Psychosexual Development," 
Genetic Psychology Monographs, 39, 1949, pp. 3-103; J. R. Thurston and P. H. Mussen, "Infant 
Feeding Gratification and Adult Personality," Journal of Personality, 1950-1951, pp. 447-457. 
"I William Craig, "On Axiomatizability Within a System," J7ournal of Symbolic Logic, XVIII, 
1953, pp. 30-32; see also William Craig, "Replacement of Auxiliary Expressions," Philosophical 
Review, LXV, 1956, pp. 38-55. 
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entities can be replaced by some theory T2 which contains no terms that refer to 
unobservables and yet has the same empirical deductive consequences as T1. So, 
according to Maclntyre's second requirement, not only can "Freud's hypothesis as 
to the infantile origin of adult traits and disorders" be formulated without the uncon- 
scious without loss of deductive power in this precise sense, but all the empirical 
generalizations which the theories of subatomic particles are supposed to explain can 
also be formulated without reference to these theories without loss of deductive power. 
The theory of the electron is as unexplanatory, on Maclntyre's second requirement, 
as the theory of the unconscious and for the same reason; namely any theory which 
contains such expressions can be replaced by another theory which does not without 
loss of deductive power relative to the theory's observable consequences. 
But as Craig has pointed out, and several noted philosophers of science have 
argued,31 Craig's results do not show that theories which postulate unobservable 
entities are unnecessary in science. Indeed, a Craigian replacement of such theories 
is done at a great loss. 
(1) A Craigian replacement is in general an unwieldy and cumbersome theory with 
an infinite set of postulates. Theories with terms that refer to unobservables, on the 
other hand, may preserve deductive simplicity allowing a few postulates to have as 
their consequences a large body of empirical propositions. 
(2) More importantly, however, a Craigian replacement does not preserve in all 
cases the inductive systematization of the original theory. 
(3) Moreover, the history of science suggests that theories couched solely in terms 
of observables do not have the heuristic value of theories that are not couched solely 
in terms of observables. 
Whether psychoanalytic theory does in fact provide deductive simplicity and 
inductive systematization and does possess heuristic value is another matter. The 
point is that Maclntyre neglects these possible values of the theory of the unconscious 
and judges it on grounds such that all theories in science containing terms which refer 
to unobservable entities are unwittingly excluded. Indeed, Maclntyre unwittingly 
excludes from science those theories he considers to have the highest explanatory 
value. 
To sum up: Maclntyre has suggested two requirements for the admissibility of 
theories in science containing terms which refer to unobservable entities. If we take 
Freud's followers at their word, then a great deal more "follows" from the theory of 
the unconscious than the behavior it was originally introduced to explain. Thus 
Maclntyre's first requirement is met. On the other hand, if we don't take them at 
their word, then a close examination must be made of the inferences that are supposedly 
drawn from the theory both in the clinical situation and elsewhere. Maclntyre has 
not done this, hence his conclusion that nothing more follows from the theory is not j ustified and he has not shown that his first requirement is not met. Maclntyre's second 
requirement is too strong. It turns out to make all theories in science that refer to 
unobservables inadmissible and, moreover, to overlook the possible values a theory 
31 See C. G. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, II, ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1958), pp. 57-81; Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt Brace and 
World Inc., 1961), pp. 134-137; I. Scheffler, "Theoretical Terms and a Modest Empiricism," 
Philosophy of Science, ed. A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), 
pp. 167-173. 
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like Freud's might have. We may conclude, therefore, that MacIntyre has not done 
what he set out to do; namely to show that Freud's theory of the unconscious lacks 
explanatory power. 
III 
8. Conclusion. Our examination of Pap's and MacIntyre's criticism of the unconscious 
points up what not to do when critizing psychoanalytic theory. The question remains, 
however, whether the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious is explanatory. I will 
not attempt to answer this question here; instead I will briefly outline what one must 
do in order to answer it. 
In the first place, it is necessary to examine carefully the relation between the 
theoretical and observational terms of psychoanalysis. This would enable us to 
determine whether psychoanalytic theory really has any clear empirical implications. 
In particular, we would be able to determine whether the theory of the unconscious 
is connected with overt behavior in a way that permits it to be confirmed or discon- 
firmed. If it were found that the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious could not 
be confirmed or disconfirmed, the theory could hardly be considered explanatory. 
But to determine whether the theory is capable of confirmation or disconfirmation 
is not any easy task. One way to determine this would be to make a detailed and careful 
examination of the writing of Freud and other psychoanalysts in order to determine 
whether there is a clear relationship between the theoretical and observation language 
of psychoanalysis. One such investigation of Freud's writing has been attempted,32 
but more are needed. Another fruitful approach would be to make an empirical study 
of the theoretical and observational language used by psychoanalysts in their clinical 
practice. A third approach would be to examine the writings of ethnologists, exper- 
imental psychologists, and others who purport to draw testable inferences from 
psychoanalytic theory. Here it would be crucial to determine if these investigators 
are really deriving empirical implications from psychoanalytic theory, as they claim, 
or if they are actually reformulating psychoanalysis into a testable theory before 
beginning their empirical studies. 
In the second place, since psychoanalytic theory in general and the theory of the 
unconscious in particular purport to explain certain correlations that are alleged to 
hold between certain childhood events and certain adult behavior, it is necessary to 
determine whether such correlations actually exist. Obviously psychoanalytic theory 
would not be explanatory if the subject matter it purports to explain was nonexistent. 
It would be necessary, therefore, to evaluate those studies which test these alleged 
correlations. 
Finally, if it is established that the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious is 
capable of confirmation and disconfirmation and that the correlations which the 
theory purports to explain actually hold, then more subtle investigations into the 
scope, simplicity and systematizing power of the theory can be attempted. 
It should be obvious that the undertaking outlined above is a difficult one, but it 
is precisely what is needed and one should not settle for less. Indeed, one major 
weakness in both Pap's and MacIntyre's criticisms of the theory of the unconscious 
is that they are attempts to dispose of the theory in some too quick and easy ways. 
32 P. Madison, Freud's Concept of Repression and Defense, Its Theoretical and Observational 
Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961). 
